It has been a remarkably di¢ cult empirical task to identify clear-cut real e¤ects of exchange-rate regimes on the open economy. Similarly, no de…nitive view emerges as to the aggregate e¤ects of capital account liberalizations. The main hypothesis of the paper is that a direct and an indirect e¤ect of balance-of-payments policies, geared toward exchange rate regimes and capital account openness, exert a confounding overall in ‡uence on output growth, in the presence of sudden-stop crises. A direct channel works through the trade and …nancial sectors, akin to the optimal currency area arguments. An indirect channel works through the probability of a sudden-stop crisis. The empirical analysis disentagles these con ‡icting e¤ects and demonstrates that: (i) the balance-of-payments policies signi…cantly a¤ect the probability of crises, and the crisis probability, in turn, negatively a¤ects output growth; (ii) controlling for the crisis probability in the growth equation, the direct e¤ect of balanceof-payments policies is large. Domestic price crises (high in ‡ation above a 20 percent threshold) a¤ect growth only indirectly; through their positive e¤ect on the probability of sudden-stop crises.
Introduction
Every major international economic crisis of the past 15 years (save Brazil in 2002) has been rooted in rigid exchange rate regimes. 1 Indeed, there has been a long-standing view that an emerging economy under a peg, with government budget imbalances, trade de…cits, and the presence of free-market policies that facilitate the out ‡ow of capital, is likely to become vulnerable to sudden stops of capital in ‡ows; hence, to balance of payments crises. This is also the familiar logic of every fundamentals-driven currency crises models in the literature.
A more nuanced view of growth e¤ects of a peg recognizes that by …xing their currencies to international moneys (the Dollar or the Euro), …scally-disciplined emerging economies, that are rapidly accumulating exchange reserves through export growth, are able to maintain a high saving ratio, provide certainty to business, and pro…t margins to investors, based on a low and stable country speci…c rate of interest. Under this macroeconomic environment, an emerging economy could retain the con…dence of the international investors, and the peg leads to a good economic performance in the long run: output growth is high, and in ‡ation is low. In other words, switching from a ‡oat to a peg presents the economy with a trade-o¤: on the one hand, the risk of a currency crisis is aggravated; but, on the other hand, if a currency crisis is avoided, the economy may actually perform better than what it would have been under a ‡oat. , Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) and Williamson (2000) . 2 Trade-o¤s concerning the choice of exchange rate regimes are faced by policy makers when developing countries struggled with bouts of high in ‡ation. A switch from ‡oat to peg typically serves as an anchor of the stabilization package. Examples are Israel (in 1985) , and Argentina in (1991), underpinned the anti-It has been conspicuously di¢ cult, however, to identify clear-cut empirical real e¤ect of exchange-rate regimes on the real side of the open economy, for two main reasons.
The endogeneity of policy tools with respect to macroeconomic performance, and the confounding e¤ect of policy. Most studies focus on the …rst issue, typically by instrumenting the policy variables, but ignored the later issue. The purpose of this paper is to tackle both issues, namely, to delineate the "good" and the "bad" e¤ects, arising from a policy switch. Speci…cally, we introduce the e¤ect of the policy on the probability of sudden stops of capital in ‡ows, and incorporates this projected balance-of-payments crisis probability into the growth equation.
The Asian crisis of 1997-1998 could be viewed as a watershed in the international economics thinking concerning exchange rate regimes, the international contagion of macroeconomic instability from one country to another, and the deregulation of international capital ‡ows. One of the lessons is that, in the presence of weak …nancial and …scal institutions, balance-of-payments crises often follow up capital account liberalizations.
Accordingly, the paper also pursues an analysis of capital-account openness policies, in parallel to the analysis of the policy switch between a peg and a ‡oat. Speci…cally, we analyze the two possibly con ‡icting channels through which a switch from a regime of capital controls to a regime of capital-account liberalization a¤ect growth, in the presence of crisis-prone …nancial market. The de-regulation of international capital ‡ows, working through cross-country interest parities, constrain domestic growth by enhancing the in ‡ation policy package by an exchange rate targeting. Argentina adopted a hard peg (a currency board), with a comprehensive capital market liberalization package, while Israel adopted a soft peg (crawling peg), with only a phased out process towards capital market liberalization. As might have been expected, given the world economy recession after Israel's stabilization and the world economy boom that followed the Argentine's in ‡ation stabilization, Argentina grew faster than Israel in the immediate aftermath of the ‡oat-peg policy switch. However, eventually, Argentina underwent a catastrophic currency and liquidity crisis. As Paul Krugman puts it: "Argentina, once a showpiece for the new world order, quickly became a byword for economic catastrophe" (The New York Times, January 6, 2004) . In contrast, Israel has avoided a major crisis. Ten years after the ‡oat-peg policy switch, the accumulated growth in Argentina was negative, while the trend growth in Israel has been signi…cant. See Fischer and Orsmond (2002) . 3 probability of …nancial crises. 3 We also propose a re-examination of discrete high in ‡ation crises. Typically, growth falls sharply during discrete high in ‡ation crises. By introducing a probability of domestic (high in ‡ation) crises, along with the probability of external (balance-of-payments) crisis that depends on the exchange rate system, we are able to further discern the non-linear e¤ect of the exchange rate system, or capital account openness, on growth.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section we brie ‡y survey the relevant literature. In section 3 we describe the data. Section 4 develops the econometric approach. In section 5 we report our …ndings using the IMF exchange-rate-regime classi…cation. In section 6, we use the new Reinhart and Rogo¤ classi…cation, incorporate domestic price crises into the empirical analysis and report our …ndings. The paper concludes in section 7.
Literature
Recall that it has been a di¢ cult empirical task to identify clear-cut real e¤ects of "For one, the capital market (unlike the market for goods) seldom takes the form in which an agent can borrow as much as she wishes at the going interest rate. Moreover, a person demanding capital is, typically, asked by the lender to explain why she needs the money. The greengrocer, on the other hand, does not ask you why you want oranges before he agrees to sell you some." 4 An exception is Rose (2000) . In the paper, Rose uses evidence from existing currency unions in the world economy, to estimate the e¤ect of currency unions on international trade. Rose …nds that a currency union (which is an extreme form of a peg) expands bilateral trade between two average member countries by a huge proportion (200%, and more). Rose's analysis was challenged by Persson (2001 
Crisis Probability: A Model
The multiple-equilibrium …nancial crises theory does not provide a clear guide as to the role played by self-ful…lling expectations in …nancial crises. This is because in the theory the probability of a crisis is loosely related to the fundamentals. 6 Thus, it leaves as an open question whether observed fundamentals, such as government de…cits, are su¢ cient to explain crisis outcomes; or whether there is a large unexplained component, that is Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenneger (2000) , who …nd real e¤ects of exchange-rate regime in cross-country data. 5 See also Ariyoshi et al (2000) , Bhagwati (1998) , Edwards (1999 Edwards ( , 2000 and Kaplan and Rodrik (2000) . Note that the Chinese Renminbi has been pegged to the US Dollar throughout the the Asian crisis, and also after the crisis. At the same time, China went through a gradual process of removing the constraints on its closed capital account, while maintaining the rigid …xed exchange rate. Its high growth performance, since 1978, is by now well established. East Asia is moving currently towards closer cooperation on trade, bonds markets, currencies, and the management of foreign exchange reserves, which may eventually lead to a common Asian currency. 6 The 1992 EMS currency crisis inspired the second-generation models, as in Obstfeld (1994 the equilibrium set into a unique fundamentals-driven equilibrium. 7 Consider the "third-generation" model that Paul Krugman (2000) proposes to make sense of the number and nature of the emerging market crises of 1997-98. The most distinct characteristic that captured the violence of the shock to the real side of the economy in the presence of crisis is, arguably, the reversal in the current account and the corresponding massive real depreciation. We describe in this section brie ‡y the role of noisy signals in the model, using Morris and Shin (2000) approach.
There are N domestic entrepreneurs, who are single mindfully engaged in wealth accumulation, and N foreign creditors, who supply the credit necessary for domestic investment. As we will see, a foreign creditor's incentive to withhold a loan to her domestic entrepreneur counterpart is highest when all other N-1 foreign creditors do so, and vice versa.
Foreign lenders impose a limit on leverage:
where, I stand for investment in capacity by an individual entrepreneur, and the leverage is times the entrepreneur's net worth, W. The latter is given by:
and y, F and p denote domestic output, produced by a Cobb-Douglas technology with 7 See, for example, Goldstein and Pauzner (forthcoming).
In still another branch of literature on bank runs, (e.g., Peck and Shell (2003) ) there is assumed to be a sun spot driven exogenous trigger of a run. For low level of the trigger, the optimal deposit contract tolerates runs. Beyond a critical trigger, the optimal deposit contract is immune to runs. The way to avoid runs is to tighten the deposit contract in the direction of strengthening future returns. Therefore, emerging market countries (with bad …nancial history), which have a low equilibrium probability of bank runs, will also adopt policy which favors growth, because bank run-immune deposit contracts are associated with bank loans'policy that favors pro-growth investment projects.
6 a capital input income share ;net initial debt indexed to foreign goods, and the relative price of foreign goods in terms of domestic goods (the real exchange rate), respectively.
The market clearing condition from which the equilibrium real exchange rate can be solved is:
where, I=NI a; Y = N y;are aggregate domestic investment and output, respectively.
The coee…cient denotes the marginal propensity to import, andX t is the stochastic value of domestic exports in terms of foreign goods. Observe that Note that I which is …nanced, in part, by capital in ‡ows, triggers real appreciation, through a "transfer problem" mechanism. That is, due to di¤erences in the marginal propensities to spend on domestic and foreign goods, between the domestic economy and the rest of the world, a transfer of purchasing power from the rest of the world to the domestic economy results in an excess demand for the domestic good; hence the real appreciation.
Exports (or, alternatively the ratio of exports to foreign-goods denominated debt)
plays the role of the fundamental which will determine whether there will be a low-output ( no-credit) equilibrium or a high-output equilibrium. The o¤er of credit depends on what the foreign creditor thinks will be the value of the borrower collateral. However, because the debt is denominated in foreign goods, the value of borrowers'collateral depends, on the real exchange rate. The real exchange rate in turn depends on aggregate investment, which is determined by foreign creditors' incentive to lend. Every foreign creditor has to guess what the rest of the foreign creditors are going to do. A rational-expectations equilibrium of this global game will be a set of self ful…lling guesses so that the level of domestic investment implicit in the credit o¤ers must match the actual level of investment that takes place given those o¤ers.
A foreign creditor will …nance domestic investment if
where, r and r* denote the marginal productivity of capital and the foreign interest rate, respectively.
Each foreign creditor i receives a private signal i regardingX t ; i =X t + " ti :
7
The error term " ti is independently and uniformly distributed over [-"; "]. The signal can be viewed as private information of the foreign creditor.
The foreign creditor's decision whether to extend credit to the domestic entrepreneur depends on her signal. The signal provides information not only aboutX t , but also about the actions that the rest of foreign creditor will take. Under common knowledge about the fundamental,X t ;so that i =X t ;and " ti = 0, we are back to the Krugman model.
There are three possible ranges for the realizations ofX t which corespond to di¤erent resolutions to the coordination game. When realizations of the fundamental ,X t ; are in the high-exports range, there is a unique equilibrium where the credit constraint is non binding and domest investment is reltively high. When the realizations of the fundamental are in the low-exports range, the unique equilibrium is with zero domestic investment. Observe that in the private-knowledge coordination game the equilibrium p t is a decreasing function ofÑ t ; the number of foreign creditors that decide to extend credit to domestic enterpreneurs, and a decreasing function inX t , the fundamental. Therefore there exists a cut-o¤ signal i =X t + " ti , so that
for the marginal foreign creditor, who is indi¤erent when faced by the signal i = X t + " ti ; between withholding her credit , or extending it, to the domestic entrepreneur.
One can see that the cumulative distribution function, denoted by G(X), determines the ex-ante probability of a balance-of-payments crisis. The probability of balance of payments crisis is then given by
Thus the higher is the level of the fundamental, X t , the lower will be the ex-ante probability of a balance-of-payments crisis. At the same time the higher will be the expected value of domestic investment,
where _ I is the investment level determined by rate-of-return considerations, not being bound by the credit constraint.
In the private-knowledge version of the Krugman model, the fundamentals and the crisis-driven outcomes are indeed correlated. Importantly, self ful…lling beliefs can be summarized by a unique probability of crisis, which, in turn, is a function of observed fundamentals. Speci…cally, when the fundamentals are weak, the probability is large, and vice versa. The asymmetric -equilibrium setup implies that fundamentals-driven market expectations determine ultimately the observed performance of the economy. This yields a compelling interpretation to our econometric approach in this paper, where the probability of balance-of-payments crisis is at the center of the analysis.
Data
Our original data set consists of 106 low-and middle-income countries (48 African countries, 26 Asian countries, 26 countries from Latin America and the Caribbean, and 5 European countries). A subset of 100 countries, for which we have complete data, is listed in In this paper we take advantage of both the IMF and the Reinhart-Rogo¤ classi…ca-tions of exchange-rate regimes. We start with the IMF classi…cation, for which we have the complete sample of countries. We then repeat the analysis, using the Reinhart-Rogo¤ classi…cation using a sub-sample of 58 countries.
Sudden stop crises and policy switches
Our objective is to explain empirically the e¤ects of balance-of-payments policies on output growth, for economies where balance-of-payments crises are probable. Policy switch and a balance-of-payments crisis state are indicated by a binary variable.
Sudden stop crises are de…nes by a sharp depreciation in the real exchange rate. In doing so we attempt to capture the e¤ects of the crisis on the real side of the economy. 9 Speci…cally, we think of the channel which emphasizes the role of the …rm's balance sheet in determining its ability to invest; and the way the …rm reacts to large and unexpected real depreciations. 10 Evidently, unexpected ‡uctuations in the real exchange rate, rather than the ‡uctuations in the nominal exchange rate, are the ones which are likely to have signi…cant balance-sheet e¤ects. 11 Concretely, the balance-of-payments crisis is de…ned 9 Typically in the currency crisis literature sudden stops are measured by free falls in the nominal exchange rate. However, this does not distinguish between domestic price crises and balance-of-payments crises. In our indicator, crisis episodes do not include, therefore, countries which su¤er from bouts of high in ‡ation and currency depreciation, but with a relatively stable real exchange rate, because they do not qualify to be classi…ed as balanced-of-payments crises. Evidently, the real exchange rate measure for crisis is strongly correlated with sharp reversals in the current-account balance. See Milesi-Ferretti 
The Econometric Framework
To evaluate the cyclical and the persistent growth e¤ects of the exchange-rate-regime policy switch and a capital-account-openness policy switch, we address two econometric issues. First, the potentially confounding e¤ect on growth of the policy switch, working through the two con ‡icting channels. Second, the potential endogeneity of policy.
The statistical model
Let Y 1;j;t denote the growth rate of country j in time t as measured in terms of GDP per capita. Let Y 2;j;t denote a latent variable indicating the crisis prone state of the economy.
That is, if Y 2;j;t 0; a currency crises occurs, whereas if Y 2;j;t < 0 a currency crises does not occurs. That is:
where, Y 2;j;t is a binary variable which equals 1 if currency crises occurs in country j at time t and 0 otherwise. Consider two policies: (i) a ‡oat-peg policy and (ii) a liberalization-controls policy.
To simplify, assume that a policy is binary. Denote by D 1 the ‡oat-peg policy and by D 2 the liberalization-controls policy:
Roubini (2002) 
where, " 2;j;t is a country speci…c time variant i:i:d: random shock.
Let P j;t be the conditional probability that country j will face currency crisis in period t; that is P j;t = Pr(Y 2;j;t = 1 j ): Given our assumption,
Assuming that " 2;j;t N (0; 1) then:
where is the cdf of the unit normal distribution (above).
Note that we can identify the parameters of the "crisis-selection" equation by estimating the Probit equation (7) ;where the projected likelihood is:
Assuming momentarily that policy is exogenous 12 we could recover the parameters of interest in the growth equation by estimating the following equation:
12 Typically, policy action is endogenous. Thus obviously we cannot identify the parameters of interest using the OLS estimators for equations (4) and (7). Therefore, we use lag variables to instrument policy variables D 1;j;t and D 2;j;t . Equation (9) provides consistent estimates for the parameters of interest.
The confounding e¤ect of policies
To illustrate the importance of incorporating crises state into the empirical analysis assume that the standard growth equation is estimated using valid instrument for policy variables. Consider the confounding of the direct and indirect e¤ects of balance-of-payments policies on growth.
The estimated growth e¤ect of D 1 and D 2 when the likelihood of a currency crisis is ignored are:
and:
where D IV 1;j;t ; D IV 1;j;t are the instrumented policy variables. It is common wisdom that the likelihood of currency crisis has a negative e¤ect on growth:
It is also common to assume that a peg exchange rate increases the likelihood of a currency crisis (all other things equal), and that capital controls reduce the probability of such a crisis:
Therefore, the IV estimate for the e¤ect of exchange-rate regime on growth equals to:
13 where the IV estimate for the e¤ect of capital controls on growth is:
Note that the @E ( 1 ) =@D 1;j;t and @E ( 1 ) =@D 1;j;t are the the (sample) average e¤ect of the policy on the probability of facing a crisis. hood of a sudden stops crisis, in evaluating the e¤ect of peg- ‡oat or liberalization-controls policies on growth, one understates the direct e¤ect of each one of these policies. Namely, the ceteris paribus positive e¤ect of a peg policy on growth is biased downwardly to zero and the ceteris paribus negative e¤ect of capital controls on growth is upwardly biased toward zero.
Why should a policy maker care about the ceteris paribus e¤ect of a policy rather than the reduced form e¤ect?
Our model makes clear that the overall e¤ect of policy (D 1 and D 2 ) ; via the crisisprobability channel, is intrinsically non-linear. There is a range of values of the determinant variables in which the e¤ect of policy on the likelihood of a crisis is large, and another where it is small. Accordingly, the overall e¤ect of the policy on growth depends on the values of determinants of the the crisis probability.
IMF classi…cation: …ndings
We estimate both the cyclical as well as the persistent e¤ects of exchange-rate and capitalcontrols regimes on growth, controlling for their e¤ect on the likelihood of a sudden-stop crisis. We report out …ndings in Table 3 and Table 4 .
We start with the e¤ects of ‡oat-peg and capital-controls-liberalizations switches. We do so, with, and without country …xed e¤ects. To underscore the role of policy on growth via its indirect e¤ect on the probability of a crisis, we estimate each speci…cation twice, including and excluding the probability of a crisis.
The main …ndings of Table 3 Turning to the e¤ects in the short and the long run, Table 4 demonstrates that: (i)
While policy switches do a¤ect the crisis probability, policy levels do not; (ii) Controlling for the crisis probability in the growth equation, the two policy switches, as well as the two policy levels, a¤ect growth; (iii) However, conditioning out the country (time) invariant heterogeneity, policy switches, but not policy levels, a¤ect growth; (iv) Controlling for country …xed e¤ect, we …nd that the long run e¤ects of policies are insigni…cant. The latter is due to the fact that it is hard to distinguish between country …xed e¤ects and the permanent e¤ects of exchange rate regime and capital controls on growth.
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6 The Reinhart-Rogo¤ classi…cation and the role of domestic price crises Calvo and Reinhart (2002) have emphasized that many countries that claim to have ‡oating exchange rates do not allow the exchange rate to ‡oat freely, but rather deploy interest rate and intervention policy to a¤ect its behavior. From this point they appear to draw two conclusions: …rst, that the claim that countries are moving away from adjustable peg exchange rate systems is incorrect; and second, that countries for good reasons hanker after …xed exchange rates, which they can best obtain through hard pegs. This idea prompted an interest in a new classi…cation of exchange rate regimes. Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) In line with Reinhart and Rogo¤ our …ndings in the previous section that exchangerate policy switches, rather than policy levels, a¤ect growth, may re ‡ect some missclassi…cations.
Domestic price crises have been also the subject of growth research. For the empirical literature that looks at the relationships between in ‡ation and growth, Bruno and Easterly (1998) propose a method which is based on discrete high in ‡ation crises. That is, periods when in ‡ation is above some threshold, say 40 percent a year. They …nd that growth falls sharply during discrete high in ‡ation crises, then recovers quickly after in ‡ation falls below the threshold. Their approach, however, implies that growth is negatively a¤ected by in ‡ation only above the threshold. In other words, in ‡ation a¤ects growth only when a domestic crisis prices in fact occurs. In contrast, our approach points to the role of the fundamentals as re ‡ected in the probability of a crisis on growth, even if the crisis episode is not realized.
One way to model the e¤ect of the fundamentals underlying a domestic price crisis on growth is by adding the probability of the domestic price crises as an argument in the growth equation (see equation (4)). Another way is to incorporate these fundamentals directly as an argument in the sudden stop probability equation (5).
We preview the estimation of the model with basic statistics about ‡oat-peg switches, external and domestic crises. Table 5a describes the frequency of currency and price crises in the sub-sample for which we have the Reinhart-Rogo¤ classi…cation. Table 5b describes the frequency of exchange-rate regime switches. Comparing the table 5a and 5b to Table   1 , we see that in the new classi…cation of exchange rate regimes the frequency of exchange rate policy switches is signi…cantly larger.
In Table 6 we report our estimates for the growth equation using the Reinhart-Rogo¤ classi…cation.
We …nd, like in the IMF classi…cation, that the probability of sudden stops is a major factors in explaining the variation in the persistent growth of countries. Classifying into ‡oat and peg using the Reinhst-rogo¤ classi…cation we …nd that the policy level, rather than policy switch, a¤ect signi…cantly growth. Now turn to the e¤ect of domestic nominal prices on growth. When domestic price crises are excluded as a determinant of real exchange rate crisis probability, the latter has a signi…cant negative e¤ect on growth.
Similarly, when domestic price crises are included as a determinant of a sudden stop crisis probability, the latter has a signi…cant negative e¤ect on growth. But, when both the sudden stop crisis probability, which includes nominal price crises, and the sudden stop crisis probability, which excludes nominal price crisis, appear in the growth equation, only the former has a signi…cant negative e¤ect. This means that a nominal price crisis a¤ects growth only via its a¤ect on sudden stop crises.
Conclusion
Our model makes clear that the overall e¤ect of balance-of-payments policy is intrinsically non-linear, via the crisis-probability channel. There is a range of the explanatory variables in which the e¤ect of policy on the likelihood of a crisis is substantial, whereas there are other ranges where it is not. The expected ceteris paribus e¤ect of a policy switch varies with the magnitude of the crisis-probability. Accordingly, exogenous shocks to the underlying economy a¤ect the desirability of policies such as exchange-rate regime and capital-account liberalization.
Many developing countries, which have switched from ‡oat to peg, did so as a means of stabilizing in ‡ation. 13 Nonetheless they experienced di¤erent growth rates. For instance, consider the switched from ‡oat to peg in Israel ( 1985) and in Argentina (1991). Israel managed the probability of sudden stops by gradual liberalization and a more ‡exible exchange-rate policy. In contrast, Argentina hankered around a currency board system and fully liberalized its capital account, both increasing the probability of sudden stops.
This may explain the di¤erent growth performances of these two countries.
Future research can address also the issue of dollarization. Conventional wisdom suggests that a switch from a ‡oat to a peg reinforces dollarization. Currency crises in dollarized economies are expected to be triggered by self-ful…lling expectations, and have adverse output e¤ects through a balance-sheet-crisis mechanism (as in Paul Krugman (2000)). Reinhart, Rogo¤ and Savastano (2004) …nd that dollarization appear to increase exchange rate pass-through. This mechanism may reinforce the claim that "fear of ‡oat-ing"is a greater problem for highly dollarized developing economies.
14 Our approach should not be limited to the study of sudden stops crises, balanceof-payments policies and growth. In fact, this framework is potentially useful for the evaluation of policies, when the fundamentals of a crisis a¤ect the desired outcomes, yet their realizations are not very frequent. For example, monetary and …scal policies may often a¤ect the fundamentals behind banks and stock market crises. Proper evaluation of these policies should not ignore their e¤ect on the probability of a crisis, although actual crises are not very frequent. 13 For an integrated analysis see Calvo and Vegh (1999) . 14 See also Calvo and Reinhart (2000) .
of L, consume but not save.
where, I a stands for investment in capacity by an individual entrepreneur, and the leverage is times the entrepreneur's net worth, W. The latter is given by:
where, y, F, and p denote domestic output, produced by a Cobb-Douglas technology with a capital input income share ;net initial debt indexed to foreign goods, and the relative price of foreign goods in terms of domestic goods (the real exchange rate), respectively. Capital fully depreciates within one period.
where, Y = N y; I = N I a ;denote aggregate output and investment, respectively. The coee…cient denotes the marginal propensity to import, andX t is the stochastic value of domestic exports in terms of foreign goods.
A foreign creditor will …nance domestic investment made by its coresponding enterpreneur if
The foreign creditor's decision whether to extend credit to the domestic entrepreneur depends on the private-knowledge signal. The signal provides information not only about X t , but also about the actions that the rest of foreign creditor will take. Under common knowledge about the fundamental,X t ;so that i =X t ;and " ti = 0, we are back to the Krugman model. Observe that in the private-knowledge coordination game the equilibrium p t is a decreasing function ofÑ t ; the number of foreign creditors that decide to extend credit to domestic enterpreneurs, and a decreasing function inX t , the fundamental. Therefore there exists a cut-o¤ signal i =X t + " ti , so that
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